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On Sovereignty and Overhumanity
Why It Matters How We Read Nietzsche's
Genealogy 11:2*
Christa Davis Acampora

There is nearly unanimous agreement, among those who bother to pay atremion to
Nietzsche's anomalous claim about the "sovereign individual" in the second essay
of On the Genealogy of Morals that the "sovereign" is Nietzsche's ideaJ, and many
more still rake sovereignty as the signature feature of the overman Niensche heralds

in his Thus Spoke Zarathustra and other writings. 1 describe the reception among
Nietzsche scholars as "nearly unanimous" because there has been at least one cry of
dissem: that issued by Lawrence Harab. 1 Curiously, his brief but incisive commems
about the problematic nature of several readings along these lines continue to be
ignored. With this chapter, I add my voice to his and call for a rally. Emphases on
Nierzsche's sovereign individuality encourage whar J shall argue is a misreading of
dte passage in quesrlon. Moreover, this mistake has far-reaching consequences insofar as it supports a mischaracteriz.adon of Niensche's philosophy generally and
results in a f.tilure to consider significant ways in which Nietzsche's conception of
the subject might be relevanr for comemporary moral philosophy.
Nietzsche most certainly is not upholding what he calls "the sovereign individual"
as an ideal for which we should strive, and there is plenty of evidence to support the
assertion. Few mauers in Nietzsche interpretation are dearly and decisively seeded,
bur I imend ro add this one to that meager stock. In what follows, I scrutinize the
context of Lhe passage in quescion and its resonance with the overarching theme of
*Revised by the author from its original publicacion in International Studies in Phi/mopby 36:3

(F.JI2004)o 127-45.
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the work in which it. -appears (my section I). I then consider what would be necessary
co fi.mher support the majoriry view and show why such pro jeers are umenable (seccion 11). Finally, I briefly discuss why I think ir maners very much that we get rhis
one right (section Ill). ~he "sovereign individual" has animated numerous discussions of Nietzsche's politics and ethics. How we read GMII:2 strikes at rhe heart of
what we take co be the most significam feamres of Nier-L.Sche's constructive philosophical projects.

a cerrain kind of freedom. Moreover, since Nietv;;che seems co emphasize orders of
rank and entidemem throughom his writings, some compound their first error with
a second in suggesting that it is Nietzsche's position char rhis son of' cntidcment is
something char might actually be desirable, that our seizure of ir would repre.<>ent
some son of completion of ourselves, the full realization of humanity. The more
literal translation "who is permined ro promise" or "who is capable of promising"
dearly better captures the sense of Nierzschc's phrase, since che very next senrence
contrasts promising wirh irs coumeracdng Kraft-the power or force of forgerring. 4
Thus read, we better appreciate Nietzsche's suggestion that promising relies upon
some kind of power (we soon learn thar ir is remembering) that has been Cultivated
to the point rhat it ourscrips forgetting. Promising depends upon a Kraft-it is not
an encidemem or right-and irs enhancement emerged rhrough a developmemal
process in which a counteracdng Kraft was diminished.
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I. "THE SOVEREIGN INDMDUAL": WHAT IT IS
The passage in question is familiar:

149

If we place oursdves at the end of rhis tremendous process, where the tree at last brings

The second account of the genealogy of morality rhar consrirmes GM II charts rhe

fonh fruit, where society and the moraliry of custom at last reveal what they have simply

struggle of rhe rwo opposing forces of remembering and forgening.. rhercby casting
morality in terms similar to how Nietv;;che describes tragic arr as resring upon rhe
contesr of the artistic forces of creadon and destruction in The Birth of Tragedy. The
rask of GM II is co offer an account of how rhe Kraft of remembering accomplished
irs vicrory, and ro chart the deleterious effects of rbe ::~.trophy of forgetting in rhe
course of human dcvdopmem. The message is: the acquisition of the kind of willing
that is had in promise-making came with a price-the diminution of forgetting, and
we allow it to wither only at our peril. This interpretation is reinforced in Nietzsche's insistence that forgetting is nor merely an absence or failure of remembering,
but is rather somerhing that is positive~)' active in its own right. Nietzsche couches the
maccer in org.mic, biological terms of nutrition and digestion: "it lforgetring] is ..
responsible for rhe facr rhat what we experience and absorb enters our consciousness
as lirrle while we arc digesting it (one might call the process 'inpsychation ')-as does
rhc thousandfold process, involved in physical n~urishmenr-so-<alled 'incorporation"' (GMII:l). Were it not fiu forgetting, iris suggested here, we would nor have
a soul, a psyche, much as we would nor have a body, a corpus, were we nor able to
eat. The ~hemes of forgetting as an active force and Nierzsche's use of metaphors for
digestion have nor gone unnoticed. Bm what seems to have been overlooked is whar
rhis has to do with what Nierzsche says in the very next seccion of essay two in which
the reference to the sovereign individual occurs. How is the sovereign individual the
product of a process in which rhe acrive forces of remembering and forgeuing struggle, with the result that remembering surmounts and suppresses its opponent? More
precisely, what in the course of this struggle does rhe sovereign individual trump?
Answering the latter quesrion leads us back to a deeper invesrigarion of forgetting.
Briefly, we can recall char rhe good of forgerring, as Nietzsche writes in GM II: I,
issues from its effects of inplychating consciousness; another way of putting it is that
forgetting plays a role in the regulatory process that permits us to appropriate our
experience such rhat we rake from ir whar is necessary and rid ourselves of what is
not. 5 Nietzsche does not think that an individual is simply 0:1. monadic unitary emiry.

been dte means to: tlu:n we discover that rhe ripest fruit is the sovn?ign individual, like
only to himsdf, liberated again from mol"'ality of custom, autonomous and supramoral

(for 'autonomous' and 'moral' are mutuaJiy exclusive), in shorr, the man who has his
own independent, protracted will and the right to make promises-and in him a proud
consciousness, quivering in every muscle, of what has at length been achieved and
become Resh in him, a consciousness of his own power and freedom, a sensation of
mankind come to completion.2

A good place to begin is to consider what is the nature of"this nemendous process"
so char we can bcner appreciate how it is that the sovereign individual is its ftuit.
The second essay of the Genealogy explicitly nears che development of concepts associa[l:~d wirh moral responsibility and culpability. There, Nietzsche considers r:he fundantental basis of" 'guile,' 'rhe bad conscience,' and the like," beginning with
promise-making. Nietzsche is essentially asking: What sore of being, what sort of
animal, musr one become in order co be able co make promises?3
On our way coward considering how Niensche addresses this question, which
orients rhe rest of the essay, we mighr narc a consideration co which we will return
in the next section: Kaufmann and Hollingdale's translation of rhe very first sentence
of the second essay has led many astray. h is often cited precisely as it appears in
their English rranslacion: "To breed an animal with the right to make promises-is
nor this rhe paradoxical task rhar nature has set itself in rhe case of man? is it not
the real problem regarding n1an?" ["Ein Thier heranzOchren, das versprechen darfisr das nicht gcrade jene paradoxe Aufgabe selbst, welche sich die Name in Hinsicht
auf den Menschen gestdlr hat? isr cs nicht das eigentliche Problem vom Mcnschen?"
(KSA 5, 291)] Rendering "das versprechen darf" as "with the right co make promises" has encouraged those who rely on the transladon co think that Nierzsche sees
promise-making as an entitlement that one must earn or which one is granted, and
which presumably stands in contrast wtrh somerhing co which one might be inherently obliged. As I ~hall discuss at grearer lengrh below, it has been associated with
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Instead, we are composed of a multiplicity of forces such that "our organism is oligarchically arranged." Nier-LSche's claim about the organization of the kind of organism we arc warranrs underscoring here, because ir is both consistent with what
Nier-tschc does write aboU£ rhe "ficdon" of the concept of individuals (e.g., BGE
16-20 and GM 1:13), and inconsistent with (what he doesn'twrite about) an individual who actually is sovereign and self-legislacing. We shall have occasion co address
Lhis issue in greater derail in rhc second section ef this chapter.
Returning co the maner wirh which Nietz.sche's second essay begins, we can now

rations in rhe scholarly literature, to consider what general image of Nietzsche thC>se
interpretations support, and to see whether such readings become difficult to susrain
once the support lent by the concept of rhe soverdgn individual is withdrawn. It is
quite difficult to select which readings of GM 11:2 should serve as the basis of this
discussion. Once I commiued mysdf co this topic, I was surprised to discover just
how rampant the problc::m is, and how frequently the "sovereign individual" creeps
into all manner of discussions of Nietzsche's works. 6 Those who point to the sovereign individual as Nicrzsche's ideal gener.ally associate it with "the higher men," and
sovereign individuality is often discussed in the context of clarifying what it means
tn "become what one is." In this section, I shall recount Hatab's points against the
prevailing readings of rhe sovereign individual, supplement his claims, and critique
several recent exemplary discussions that affirm the sovereign as Nietzsche's ideal.
In his A Nietzschean Deftnse of Democracy, Hatab asserts rhat the "sovc::reign individual" names "the modernist ideal of subjective auwnomy,'' and that "Nietzsche
displaces" racher than embraces such ideals. 7 This becomes clear when one notices,
as virtually no one else does, char Nicrzsche thinks that modern conceptions of the
individual as autonomous have been crafted in order ro press them into the setvice
of moral accountability and retribution: "'Auronomy,'" Harab writes, "is something that Nietzsche uaces to rhe inversion of master morality; freedom in rhis sense
means 'responsible,' 'accountable,' and therefore 'reformable'-all in the sctvicc of
convincing the strong to 'choose' a different kind of behavior (GM I:l3)."H Thus,
the distinguishing characteristic of the sovereign individual as it is described in GM
II:2-namely, that it auronomous-is precisely what Nietzsche identifies as the legacy of moralization, which has produced the decadence that he associates with
humanity in its modern formY I have addressed abC>ve how Nietzsche advances a
quasi-physiological hypolhesis aboul this process iu terms of the deve!C>pment of
powers of forgetting and remembering, and l shall ierurn to chis maner below.
Related tn the issue of autonomy is Nietzsche's conception of freedom, which
ambiguous as it may be, Harab advises, is neverrhelc::ss dearly in tension with the
kind of freedom associated with the sovereign individual who would he "ma.s:ter of
ftee will." Hatab asks his readers to recall BGE 21 in which Nietzsche rejects idea of
the completely free will: "the desire ro bear rhe entire and ulrimare responsibility for
one's actions oneself, and ro absolve God, rhe world, ancescors, chance, and society
involves nothing less than to be precisely [a} causa sui," which Nietzsche describes
as "the best self-comradiction that has been conceived so far, it is a son of rape and
perversion of logic." But Niensche's rejection of free will dC>es not signal his supposition- of a completely unftee will instead: "Suppose someone were thus to see
through the boorish simpliciry of this celebrated concept of'free will' and pur it our
of his head alwgerher, I beg of him w carry his 'enlighrenment' a step further, and
also put out of his head the conrrary of this monstrous conception of 'free will': f.
mean 'unfree will,' which amounts to a misuse of cause and effect." Nietzsche
advances ideas about the concept of causality in numerous works. In the passage
under consideration from BGE. Nietzsche advises ho!ding "cause" and "effect" as
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rcformulare its inaugural question rhus: What must have happened-from an
organic devdopmenral srandpoim-in order for us ro be able (for nature to have
granted w; the ability) ro make promises? Clearly, this is a quescion that is raised
ahout humankind generally. It applies to the kind of being that makes us human
beings. It is nor asked about individual humans. Indeed, t:ach of the essays of the
Genealogy endeavor, from a variety of perspecdves, to offer a creation story of how
rhc human animal, generally, came lO be what it is, cmwined with an etiology of
moral concepts. The second essay is abom the developmenc of humankind as the
animal with a conscience. What characterizes our species, at least as it is cast in chis
second essay, is the Etcr that some forces were strengthened over ochers in the course
of our development. This process was completed (hence, it is not some tantalizing
possibility for furure philosophers ro achieve) in pursuit of a particular "consciousness of ... power and freedom," a "sensation" stemming from having and exercising
the kind of power realized in promise-making. Hooked on that feelihg, so to speak,
human beings have (perversely) embraced their characteristic deformity (i.e., the
atrophy of forgccring that occurs through the hyper-development of remembering).
Indeed, rhe aesrhcsis of power that courses rhroughout the entire economy of
prmnise-m2king-making promises, breaking them, and punishing others who are
unable or unwilling to keep promises-is so great that humans have even instigated
their own further deformily (i.e., more sophisticated mnemonics and the extirpation
of ~Orgetfulncss).
Nietzsche's preoccupation wirh this process in On the Genealogy of Morals and
elsewhere is tied ro his concern for figuring out wherher autonomy really is the telos
of humanity thar modern philosophy and the emerging social sciences claim it ro
be. What development might rake us beyond ourselves, Nietzsche asks, and what
would we be like if we overcame humanity as such? Would such overhumanity entail
soverdgn individualily? I believe Nietzsche thinks not, at least not as it is described
in GMII:2.

II. "THE SOVEREIGN INDMDUAL":
WHAT IT IS NOT
In the course of sorting through this particular issue it is necessary to consider how
the idea of the sovetf;:ign individual has been pressed into service in variOus imerpre-
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"pure concepts," fictions that are useful for communication bur which do not have

things "souverain" in the nmebooks between 1882 and 1889, and these· scant references support the reading of rhac I have offered in the first section of rhis chaprer.
Simply pur. there is not enough textual evidence to support rhe general and oft~
repeated claim that the sovereign individual of GM 11:2 is Nietzsche's ideal type.
The more inreresdng issues emerge when we consider whar one must rake Nierz~
sche to be saying when one considers the sovereign individual ro be rhe ideal. A
prominent feature of such discussions revolves around d1e maHer of "having rhe
right to make promises." I take it that those who are wont co emphasize this phrase
wish to draw a distinction between promising as an obligation that "the herd"
imposes upon others in order to protecr itself, and those who have risen above sim~
ply meeting char imposed obligation and who are willing ro accept the responsibilicy
to secure their word for themselves. 16 Put another way, rhe distinction drawn
appears ro be: (1) relying upon the insritmion of promise~keeping (and che desire
people have to avoid the harm that might come from the breaking of promises given
to rhem) as the basis upon which a prhmise is made versus (2) agreeing ro serve as
the guaramor of one's word for oneself. I can see how such an imerpretation can be
rendered consistent with Nietzsche's preoccupation· with drawing distinctions
becween the herd and those who somehow escape it, but how could it be that rhe
Nietzsche who so emphasizes becoming, and who is suspicious of the concept of
the subject (as rhe "doer behind rhe deed"), could think that is desirable-Icc alone
possible--that a person could ensure his or her word in the future? How -could one
promise to do something, to stand security fOr something, that cannot be predicted
and for which one is, in a sense, no longer the one who could be responsible for ir?
Either Nietzsche in GM 11:2 temporarily sets aside the concerns that preoccupy nor
only his earlier thinking but also the very same book in which the passage in question appears (cf. GM I: 13), or there is something wrong with anriburing such views
EO Nietzsche. I am inclined to think rhe Iauer is rhe case, because rhis is not rhe only
inconsistency at the heart of such interpretations.
Nor only does Nietzsche think of the human subject, and all other entities for
that matter, as having their being as a kind of becoming, bur there is plenty of evidence that Nietzsche also thinks rhar our very conception of individuals is suspect,
Nietzsche conceives of human beings, like all other organisms, as pluralirics; as com~
plcxcs of forces, not as discrete individual entities. This is nor ro say that there arc
no individuals; the particularity of rhe relations among (or arrangemenr of) rhe
forces we are accoums for our individualicyY The very interesting recent work on
Nierzsche's knowledge of and conception of science bears Our chis mauer and traces
rhe relevant literature. 1M Nierzsche chinks thar a well-functioning plurality, as nored
above, is one that is governed as an oligarchy (and this stands in comrasr with the
view of Plato's Socrares in the Republic, who characterizes the best soul as modeling
an aristocracy}.
It is at this poiOt that rhe earlier discussion of forgetting, which sets the theme of
the second essay, becomes signific<l.llt again, because forgetting makes the oligarchic

expUmatory powcr. 10
Finally, Hatah notes that, "the sovereign individual is described as claiming power
over fare, which does not square wirh one of Nietzsche's cencral recommendations
amor foti (EH II, I O)."n Abouc the so-called sovereign individual, Nietzsche writes'
"The pro~d awareness of the cxrraordinary privilege of resporlSibility, rhe conscious~
ness of rh1s rare freedom, this power over oneself and over fare, has in his case penernued to the profoundest depths and become inscinct, the dominacing instinct.
What will he call this dominating instinct, supposing he feds the need ro give it a
n:une? The answer is beyond doubt: chis sovereign man calls it his comcience" (GM
11:2). Committing ont:self to conquering fate, which the sovereign individual of GM
11:2 does as pan of raking responsibility for the promises he makes, would seem co
stand in rhe way of, would specifica11y bind one to an idea char would prevent one
~rom, l_oving one's ~are. Replacing the ideal char prevents one from loving one's fate
IS prcc1scly what N1etzsche envisions at the end of GM II, and Zarathustra is sup~
posc_d EO make such _overcoming possible. 12 As I shall discuss below, iris overcoming
the Jdcal of humamty as ulrimarely and fundarnemally sovereign in rhe sense provided in GM II:2 rhar "overhumaniry" is supposed to represem.
But, d1c fact that rhe ''sovereign individual," as described in GM 11:2, is at odds
wirh how Nietzsche rhinks about the composite nature of rhe self, his critique of the
concept of free will, and his emphasis on amor foti, does not hinder those keen on
l~lcaci.ng sovereign individuality at the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy. A represenranve VIew of the sover~ign as Nietzsche's ideal is advanced in David Owen's "Equalicy,
Democracy, and Selt-Respecr: ReAections on Nietzsche's Agonal Perfectionism "13
and Richard White devotes an enrire book ro the concept of sovereignty in Ni;tzsche's philosophy, Nietzsche and the Problem of Sovereignty, 1" bmh of which I con~
s.ider here. Withour doubr, others could be added, and the meager review of the
lueraru~e char l am able _co elaborate here by no means represents every approach to
the ruptc. 15 Alrhough I do think I engage some of the most significant and prominent themes, the literature would repay yet more specific consideration. There are
two general poims I wish co make about the use of rhe sovereign individual in vari~
ous interpn:tations: (I) there is little in the way of suppon for the majority view that
the sovereign individual is one of rhe core ideas of Nietzsche's positive project given
that reference co such a being is limited ro rhe one seC{ion under discussion here; and
(2) any interpretation that places sovereign individuality at the hean of Nietzsche's
philosophy requires cmnmirring him w affirming other ideas, particularly about the
nature of human subjecrivity, which he clearly finds problematic.
The first poinr is very easily addressed. There is no mention of sovereignty per se
in Z, preoccupations with the Obermemch withstanding. One finds nor a peep about
the souveraine Individuum in BGE (where one might expect to encounter it in its
political comcxt, especially if such individuals are supposed ro have earned special
rights) or the works that follow the GM. There are just a smanering of references to
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arrangemenr possible. A pretense co sovereigmy is achieved with the substitution of
monarchic aspiratio~1s ... ~ The process of strengthening the force of remembering for
the p~rposes of a~h1evmg moral accoumability bears the fruit (i.e., yields rhe result
u~on _Its complcn~n) of an enrity that undermines the very purposes for which its
d1re~no_n was set: Ill the ~curse of producing a morally responsible agem, the hyperc~ln~au~n- of remcmbermg and the withering of forgetting yields a so-called sovereign mdJv1dual who, as sovereign, no longer recognizes the claims of moral law.

forces that characterizes human existence generally. Nietzsche does not call us to
realize the height of our humanity in becoming sovereign individuals (a capability
already characteristic of the human animal, a "fruit" already borne)2 1 rather, he
anticipates overcoming the concept of autonomy that buoys rhe contradictory ideal
of rhc sovereign individual, and that requires the cultivation and heightening of different powers, which are nor alien to us bur which arc nonetheless latent.
Owen docs the best job of finessing how the sovereign individual stands in relation to Nicrzsche's emphasis on becoming. It is worth considering his accounr ar
some lengrh. The confines of this chapter do not afford rhc opporrunity ro give
Owen's paper the full consideration it deserves, so I shall focus only on a passage
chat constitutes Owen's most explicit definition of the sovereign individual, which
as Owen describes it, is "not a telos" but rather a dramatization of

Thus the process of moralization that produces such an individual overcomes or
undermines its very end. Like Christianity, discussed in GM III, a morality that
endeavors ro ground itself in radical auronomy is self-overcoming. The question rhat
the Genealogy raises, without conclusively answering it, is- What comes next?-and
w.e cannot begin ~o try to answer that question if we misread (or ignore) the beginnmg of GM II. G1ven that Christian moralicy and irs secular alternatives have turned
our_ to ,undermine their very own foundacions) what, if anything, can serve as the
bas1s for how we should culrivate ourselves and our relarions ro ochers? How can
any action at all become meaningful or significant?
To consider how the problem plays om in a specific imcrpreration, I wish to
return to rhe troublesome issue of promising. If it is really such a crucial feature of
the idea.! Nietzsche envisions: rhcn why is it that one finds nowhere else such great
empl.l.asls pl~ced upon promise-making and promise-keeping? Those who wish w
proffer this 1~ea must undertake some serious contortions in order to have it appear
as though Nietzsche really does say as much himself. David Owe'n
does this we.
II
.
He rec~ncile_s Nien~che'~ sovereign-individual-as-promise-maker with the egoistic
st_rands 111. Nietzsche s ph1losophy by claiming that the sovereign individual reaJizes
Ius sovere1gmy first and foremost in rdarion ro himself. And that such is a condition
for the possi~ility of mee~ing O[hers on rhese terms. Autonomous individuality is
cast as rhc pmnacle of N!ct7.sch~'s aspirations, and Owen endeavors to ascribe to
Niet~chc .~he v,i,ew r~at one ~as a ~uty (first to oneself, and then presumably ro
others) to own ones humamry, wluch fundamentally lies in recognition of oneself
as a sovereign individual. Thus, servility, or herd mentality, is a failure to undertake
one's dudes. And failure co recognize sovereign individualirv in others Owen claim
" d
. [l h
.,
'
,,
un crmm~ s r e grounds of my own recognition self-respect, chat is, that I am,
qtul human being, a being who can stand to myself as a sovereign individual. "2o Perhaps so, if those lupine beasts of prey from GM I can he donned in Kant's civil
~he~pish _clot~~ing. B~r Owen's specification of the defining characteristic ofhuman•.ry •.s ~cllm~: I am, ~tua human being, a being who can stand to myself as a sovereign
ttu!J_vldual (underhned emphasis mine). Nietzsche's discussion begins with consideratJ~n ~f what the human animal is, the "breeding" or deveiOpmencal process
reqUired m order m make it capable of promising (i.e., chiefly by hypenrophic devclop~~nt of the power of memory and the withering of forgening). What Nietzsche
anuCJpates as the future;; for humaniry in GM 111 and in Zis precisely rhe overcoming
of_ the human such that even if we don'r become a differenr species altogether, we
mtght at leasr devdop different capacides or different relations among,the order

an animde, a will to self-responsibiliry (in Emerson's language: self~reliance), which is
manitesr in the perperual suiving ro increase, to expand, one's powers of seH:.governmem
such that one can bear, incorporate and, even, love one's fate-one's exposure to chance
and necessi1y. (In other words, the sovereign individual represents the attitude of amor
fati, dmr is, the affirmation of the fact of our exposure to fortuna,) The noble soul
reveres itself because it is engaged in overcoming icself. To srand to oneself as a sovtrtign
individual is, rhus, ro stand to oneself as one who seeks to ex:rend oneself beyond one's
current powers. In holding this view, Nietzsche is committed to a processual (i.e., nonteleological) perfectionism. n
If the sovereign individual can be conceived as realizing o; manifesting its sovereignty as an on-going process, then we can resolve a number of the issues that I have
identified as problematic, most notably the concepcion of subjectivity and irs faculties that seem ro be required for the kind of acciviry that is characteristic of the animal
who has the capacity to make promises-namely, regularity, completeness, and
identity. This reading wriggles our of conflict with Niensche's other more prominent theme of hostiliry toward teleological thinking, suggests how it can be reconciled with amor foti, and somehow ties it to self-overcoming and an extension of
powers as a kind of self-enhancement. Bur notice what is not emphasized in chis part
of Owen's interpretation, indeed what completely disappears, namely the idea of
sovereignty as tied to pwmisi,ng. This is no accident. Rather than an exercise of
self-legislating freedom, rhe autonomy of sovereign individuality instead becomes an
attitude coward necessity and change. Promise-making completely recedes as it must,
because what is required for promising-successfully distinguishing between chance
and necessity, thinking causally, correctly predicting rhe future, being mindful of
the future in the presem, even at the expense of the present, being able to decide
with certainty about what it would be right to do and how ro go about doing it,
being calculable, etc. ( CM II; I )--cannot be garnered while emphasizing the "processual" and perpetual striving that the sdf becomes when we are anentive to most
of the rest of Nietzsche's philosophyY This leads me co wonder what good it does
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ro ric the model of self-reliance as "processual perfectionism" with rhe obscure refer-

ence to the souveraine Individuum in GM 11:2. Deriving a basis for democratic
respect (and perhaps respecrability for Nietzsche among those with Kamian and liberal philosophical inclinations) seems robe Owen's goal, bur I do nor think it would
he Nietzsche's. Moreover, I am unsure that Nietzsche's work is the best place to
look for rhe richest nor ion of what democratic respect might be, and I do nor rhink
ir advisable to diswrr Nietzsche's texts in order w make it such.

III. READING GM 11:2-WHY IT MATTERS
At the root of the norian of rhe sovereign individual is the ideal of radical autonomy
and, along with it, a kind of power over oneself and freedom or distance from others. 14 Once ascribed to N iecz.sche, the idea seems to easily fit with the general reading
of Nietzsche's critique of morality, which would presumably constrain radical
auwnorny, and, more curiously, with his appeals to a new nobility (given the talk
of special "rights" and entitlements that the sovereign individual has "earned").
Thus, even when the sovereign individual is nor called by name, its core idea
stands-namely, that Nietzsche envisions rhe emergence of an ideal type whose signamre characu:ristic is a form of autonomy so highly developed that ir can successfully exercise irs will tyrannically not only in matters political bur also in those
epistcmic and axiological. But if, as I have argued above, the sovereign individual is
nor Nicrzschc's ideal-on the grounds that both terms are problematic for Nietzsche-then the core idea of the power and freedom of auconomy, of which the "sovereign individual" is supposedly emblematic, is similarly undermined. And with
rlut, rhe interpretations that radiate from that fault line are also i:hrown in doubt.
Thus, it matters very much how we read GM 11:2.
By the dramatic conclusion of the secdon in question, the process of producing a
conscience is summarized in its emirety. With that, Nietzsche suggests the process
of our developrnem thar is comained in our currenr concept of human beings is
completed. The quesdon remains whether this is truly the pinnacle of human existence. The sensarion of power we get from the mnemonics of resp01i.sibilicy leads us
to believe it is, bur Nietzsche entertains the thought that there are some possibilities-beyond cominuing relishing and relentlessly endeavoring to manifest saver~
cign individuality-that remain open to us. If we mistake the sovereign individual
as Nietzsche's ideal for that which we ought (or might want) to strive, then we overlook what Nicrzsche envisions beyond the overcoming of humanity anticipated in
rhird and final essay of rhe Genealogy.
MosL associate rhe sovereign individual with "higher humaniry," 25 claiming that
they are rhe same or at least quite similar. Bur I have sought to make the case for
rhe claim that Nietzsche sees rhe sovereign individual as standing at the end of a
process of becoming the kind of animals that human beings are. In other words, the
sovereign individual is the pinnacle of the current state of existence of humankind. 26
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If it is the case that Nietzsche envisions a kind of overcoming of humanity, some
sort of development toward what we might call pverphumanity, and the sovereign
individual stands at the end of rhe process that produced human animals, then overcoming rhe sovereign individual is what Nietzsche envisions. If the sovereign individual continues to stand as our end, even if the d1aractcr of"rhe end" is construed so
as to reconcile it with becoming, then we will fail both in understanding the task of
pursuing that something higher that Nietzsche amici pates, and, consequently, in
reaching it. 27
Still, rhe ideal of sovereignty is certainly not alien to Nietzsche, and clearly the
exercise of will that is cultivated in the strengthening of memory that promisemaking requires is compatible with Nieasche's emphasis on willing and its role in
the creacion of meaning and significance. If rhe sovereignty of the sovereign individual named in GM 11:2 is nor precisely that for which Nietzsche is striving, then what
is the other sense of sovereignty rhac Nietzsche can be said to affirm? How does ic
differ from the sovereign of GM? In briet: I think much of this work has been done
already by Richard White, whose imerpretation of what he describes as Nierzsche's
problem of sovereignty deserves greater attemion and careful examination. White
argues that Nietzsche presages rhe problem of sovereignty in which we find ourselves
caught since modern, humanist conceptions of the subject have been undermined
by the likes of philosophers as divcrsc,as Derrida and Dennett. Our contemporary
philosophical labors seems to leave us with somerhing of a false dilemma regarding
how we conceive the self: either the self is determined by narure and "sovereignty"
is merely a product of history so that the sovereign individual is something rhat
can be appreciated from an aesthetic point of view as the "creation" of necessity, or
sovereign[)' is found in che freedom ofnecessity in which case "the sovereign individual represents rhe transfiguration and salvation of nature from irself.'' 2 ~ White proposes a third alternative rhat casts Nicnschc as holding the view that sovereignty
is something that is a "strategic possibility," something Nietzsche advances from a
"perfonnative perspecrive" and rhar his writings aim to "provoke" in his readers. This
allows White to take seriously Niet7$che's writings about eternal recurrence, fare,
and necessity, while considering their tension with Nietzsche's appeals to creariviry,
willing, and a new sense of freedom. White does this without much reference to the
sovereign individual of GM 11:2, 2 ~ and I think the direction of furrher study should
follow White's lead.
The misreading of GM 11:2 and its overemphasis on Nietzsche's interest in power
potentially mischaracrcrizcs his explorations (and exhortations) of mastery. It encourages associating Nietzsche's views wirh certain strands of existentialism that are actually quire at odds with many things Nietzsche has to say about fare, his interest in
naturalism, and his complex views on freedom and nece11'Si[)'. Finally, such readings
overlook and even obscure significam ways in which Nietzsche works through several problems in conremporary philosophy, particularly regarding the issue of conceiving the subject as contingenr and relarional while ar the same rime "natural,"
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and arriculadng the bases upon which we might model our relations co ocher subjeers in light of contemporary critiques of rhe ideals of racionality and autonomy.
The rettl problem of sovereignty draws us toward more deeply exploring how we
might reconcile Nietzsche's appeals co creative willful activiry with his critiques of
subjectivity and the key ideas about idemicy and causality chat arc crucia1 for rhe
conception of sovereign ·individuality that serve as the basis of Kantian moral philosophy and contemporary theories of justice and moral psychology. This is a problem
for Nietzsche scholars, and its pursuit just might point toward promising furrher
conrributions Nieo.sche's philosophy could make ro conremporary moral philosophy. But if we: cominuc ro misread GM II:2, I think we will miss rhose oppnrtuniric::s, and, borh within and outside rhe community of those who endeavor to practice
reading well, Niernche will continue to be read as one obsessed with romantic existential fantasies about radical self-creation or self-transcendence and whose ideal
type is nearly thoroughly unsuited for social life and unable to achieve rhe bonds of
meaningful community.

despite che common view to the contrary in the hisrory ofWesrern philosophy; the overhuman
does not constitute a transcendence of rhis nature either.
4." Thus, for translation of rhis section, rhe best we have is rhe one rendered by Maudemarie Clark and Alan). Swensen (Hackert, 1998), but that will change with rhe new edirion
of the Cambridge translation by Carol Oicthe, editc::d by Keith Ansell Pearson (On the Genealogy ofMorality [Cambridge; Cambridge University ['ress, forthcoming 2006]). In their notes
on rhe phrase in question, Clark and Swensen take notice of my first point about the absence
of any language associated with rights and entidements, but they do not follow me in my
second point about the context of making a comparison between powers and capabilities.
5. Forgetting, it seems, is an important condition for experienct:-importanr for givin~
rhe shape, form, rhythm, rexrure, and depth that make the seemingly endless stream of possible objects of concern and attention an experience, ro recall Dewey's famous distinction, not
simply by piling experienct:s up or onto one another, bur by taking some away, by encouraging some to fade, recede, fall away. Forgetting in this sense grantl rather than evacuates or
eliminates; roo much remembering leaves us with experience wirhour pause and mips from
us possibilities for action. Nietzsche engages in more elaborate discussion of this idea in his
earlier wrirings, particularly BT (in the association of the Dionysian with forgetting) and HL
(where differentiation of the "stream of becoming" is described as necessary).
6. The besr defense of the case for the sovereign individual is found in Keith Ansell Pear~
son's "Nietzsche on Autonomy and Morality; The dtallenge to Political Theory," Political
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NOTES
I. See his A Nietzschean Defome ofDemocracy: An Hxperiment in Postmodern Politics (Chi-

cago: Open Court, 1995), 37-38.
2. Here, I eire Kaufmann and Hollingdalc's translation, which I amend below. KSA 5,
293: "Srellcn wir uns dagegen an's Ende des ungeheuren Proze~ses, dorrhin, wo der Baum
cndlich seine Frlichte zeitigt, wo die Societlit und ihre Sinlichkcit der Sitte endlich zu Tage
bringr, wo1.11 sit: nur das Mittel war: so finden wir als reifste Feucht an ihrem Baum das souveraine Individuum, das nur sich selbst gleiche, das von der Sittlichkeit der Sine wieder losgekommenc::, das auronome i.ibersittliche Individuum (denn 'autonom' und 'sittlich' schliesst sich
aus), kurz den Menschen des eignen unabhangigen Iangen Willens, der vertprt!chen dar:r-nnd
in ilun cin srolzes, in allen Muskeln zuckendes Bewus.stsein davon, was da endlich errungen
und in ihm leibhaft geworden ist, ein eigenclkhes Macht- und Freiheits-Bewusstsein, ein Vollcndung~·Geflihl des Menschcn Liberhaupt."
3. Subsequem w the original publication of rhis chapter, PaulS. Loeb published an article endorsing my view rhar Nietzsche's ideal is nor the "sovereign individual" but arguing for
a different reading of Nietzsche's claims abour forgetting ("Finding rhe (/bermensch in Nietzsche's Genealogy ofMorality," Journal ofNietztche Studies 30 tAurumn 2005]: 70-10 I; revised
excerpt included in rhis volume). Loeb further develops what comes afrer the "overcoming of
humanity." In this slightly revised version, I add a few minor clarifications in light of Loeb's
comments. Rather than argue point by point, I simply note here that Loeb and I apparently
disagree considerably on Nietzsche's conception of nature and the status of the human in
relation to nonhuman animals in Nietzsche's texts. This bears quite significantly on whether
Nietzsche has a view of human beings (and li.mher, the overhuman) as somehow transcending
nature. Although I do not think Loeb would explicitly endorse rhe latter, it is implied in his
argument. I do not find Niet7.sche distinguishing between the "mere animal" and the
"human." A~ rhey are characterized in CM, humans are the animals who make promisesthey have not transcended rheir animality on accoum of their being able to make promises,

Studie< 39 (1991), 276-301.
7. Hatab, A Nietzschean Defense ofDemocracy, 37.
8. Harab notes that HH 618 refers ro "Individuum" in a similar vein.
9. I provide further rexrual evidence drawn from Nierzsche in support of this claim as I
interpret his analysis of the mnemonics of punishment in my "Forgening rhe Subject," in
Reading Nietzsche at the Margim, edited by Steven Hicks and Alan Rosenberg (West l.afaycue,
IN: Purdue University Press, forthcoming 2007).
10. I discuss this idea at greater lengrh iu my "Nietzsche's Moral l,sychology,'' Blackwell
Companion to Nietzsche, edited by Keith Ansell Pearson (Malden, MA: Blackwdl Publishers,

Inc., 2006), 314-33.
11 . Hatab, A Nietzschean Defense ofDemocracy, 38.
12. Interestingly, Kaufmann and Hollingdale inappropriarely insert the notion of rights in
their translation of the passage with which the second essay concludes. They render the last
sentence as follows: "At this point it bdmovt:s me only to be silent; or I shall usurp that to
which only one younger, 'heavier with future,' and stronger than 1 has a righr-rhar to which
only Zarathustra has a right, Zara.thustra the godlm.-" Bur there is nothing in rhe German
original that implies that Nietzsche is talking abom rights. lnsread, he is dearly indicating a
kind of foedom, nor entitlement, when he writ¢>, "-was allein Zarathusrra freisrdu, Zara~
thustra dem Gordosen" (KSA 5, p. 337).
13. David Owen, "Equality, Democracy, and Self-Respect: Reflections on Nietzsche's
Agonal Perfecdonism," in The journal ofNietzsche Studies 24 (Fall 2002): 113-31.
14. Richard White in his Nietzsche and the Probkm ofSovereignty (Citicago: Univer.~ity of
Illinois Press, 1997).
15. Subsequent co the original publication of this article are Loeb's article nored above;
and Thomas Miles, "On Nierzsche's Ideal of the Sovereign Individual" (unpublished paper
presemed co the North American Nietzsche Society, 28 April 2005).
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16. Randall Havas makes this poim. Sec his Niazsc!NS Genealogy: Nihilism and the Will to
Km1wkdge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University llress, 1995), esp. 193f£ I bri~fly discuss the views
of Havas and Aaron Ridley in a note below.
17. On this idea, see Sreven D. Hales and Rex Welshon, Nietzsche's Perspectivism (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2000),
18. Numerous commentators have developed these ideas at greater length, particularly
along the lines ofNietzsche's conception of language and grammar and his relation to Boscov~
ich and Spir. For a concise review on the relevant issues, see Wolfgang Miiller-Lauter, "On
Judging in a World of Bt:coming: A Reflection on the 'Great Change' in Nieusche's Philosophy," in Nietzsche, Theories of Knowkd~, and Critical Theory, edited by BciDette E. Babich
and RobertS. Cohen (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 168-71. Compare Nietzsche's own discussion in "On the Prejudices of Philosophers" in BGE. See further Greg Whirlock's "Roger J. Boscovich and Friedrich Nietzsche: A Re-Examination" in Nietzsche,
E:.'pisternology, and Philosophy of !:i'ciroce, edited by Babette E. Babich and Robert S. Cohen
(Iloscon: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999); Robin SmaJI, "Boscovich Contra Nierzsche,"
in Philosophy and Phenomenological &search 1984 (46): 419-35; Robin Small, Nietzsche in
Context (Aidershot, England: Ashgate, 2002); Gregory Moore, Nietzsche, BioWgy, and Metaphor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Michael Steven Green's Nietzsche
and the Transcendental Tradition (Chicago: Universiry of Illinois Press, 2002).
19. This is nor ar all to suggest that Nietzsche claims we should aim to return to our
prehuman history-ir should be quite obvious that such is not possible in the same way that
it is nor possible for anyone to selectively rerurn to some prior stage of human evolutionary
development. The hisrory of Western philosophy exhibits a severe allergy to forgetting and
an association with knowledbre, or enlightenment, srricrly with remembrance. I 6nd the same
in Loeb's Conception of rhe "second forgerring" associated with Zarathustra's "enlightenment," which curiously involves a forgetting (in the sense of foregoing) furgening (iu the
sense of nut n:membering); sec pp. 166, 170-71.
20. Owen, "Equ.Uity, Democr.tcy, and Self-Respect," 116.
21. Owen is one of rhe few who at least recognize char the sovereign individual is not
Nietzsche's idt:al in rhe sense of a future possibility (although Owen appears to think it is a
worthy ideal tOr rhe present). Owen rightly points out thar Nietzsche associates the sovereign
individual wirh rhe "morality of custom," a stage, in Niet-lSChe's hisrorical account of the
development of morality that he considers "premoral" (with Kant, Sittlichkeit precedes Moralit/it). However, I consider rhe sovereign individual robe the ideal that serves as the inaugural
transition between d1e prt:moral and moral stagt:s. Since the GeneaWgy appears to be orit:nted
toward envisioning a "posrmoral" stage of development, it is curious rhat Owen would
endeavor ro sketch Nietzsche's view about that stage by drawing on the type produced by the
process of prcmoral customs.
22. Owen, "Equality, Democracy, and Self-Respect," 118. Compare with David Owen
and Aaron Ridley, "On Fate," International Studies in Philosophy 35:3 (2003): 63-78.
23. Instead, Owen seems to emphasize ".self-responsibility" and upholding one's commitments. For some concise accoums of the sovereign individual that do keep promise-making
from and center, see Randall Havas, "Nietzsche's Idealism" and Aaron Ridley, "Ancillary
1110ughts on an Ancillary 'JCxr," both in The journal of Nietzsche Studies 20 (2000): 90-99
and 100-8, respectively. For Havas, the sovereign individual is the paradigmatic willing
subjecr. he offers us ~nsrruction on what it means to will someching: "giving our word" is

how this happens, and it is in rhis that we realize our "shared humanity" with others. Ridlt:y
apparently arrributes to Nit:rzsche the idea that raking responsibility is a ach.it:vemen~ or an
accomplishment for which we might aim. l have endeavored to argue rhar Nietzsche 1s challenging the idea that sovereign individuality and aU that it entai~s is the pinna~le of hum~n
progress. I am not suggesting that Nietzsche does nor see a~yrhmg ar all that IS valuable. m
the process of momlization and the working of the bad conscience that produces the soveretgn
individual as an ideal rype. Indeed, I rhink a very interesting and persuasive case could ~e
made that Nietzsche considers the pracdce of willing rhat rhe (vain) pursuit of sovt:reign individuality allows us to t:xercise has significant advantages, much as the slave revoir in morality
(discussed in GM I) makes human heings inrercsting and creative in ways they had not been
previously, and much as the ascetic ideal is shown to have been a highly effective .(yet. als.o
destructive) mechanism fol" producing value (in GM III). But the ideal of tht: s~vert:1gn tnd~
viduallike slave moraliry (and, perhaps, the ascetic ideal) is something chat N1etzsche envi-
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sions overcoming.
.
.
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.
24. It is precisely this reading rhar leads many to cla1m chat Nietzsche s pohncs are decidedly aristocratic and antidemocratic. Owen and Havas endeavor to associate Niensc~e's vie~s
with perfectionism and liberalisnl, thereby making Nietzsche's philosophy companble wnh
democratic theory. Bur if we grant that Niensche is not embr.tcing rhe sovereign individual,
but rather is calling for its overcoming, the need to discuss how sovereign individuality can
be rendered l."'Omparible with democratic political theory disappears. Lawrence Hatab accomplishes the same without recourse to the sovereign individual.
25. As an example, see Richard Schacht, Nietzsche (New York: Routledge, 1983), 294.
26. This is not ro say that we are all already sovt:reign individuals bul rather that the concept of humanity that we presently hold is one that takes sovereign individuality as a real and
desimble possibility for us to endeavor to achieve.
27. I mainrain that whatever is involved in overhumanity, and I have nor endeavored to
describe it here, the beings who auain it or are involved in the process of pursuing ir remain
nonerhdess animals. NierLSChe thinks the human is animal through and through. Of course,
rhe human animal has its distinctive features, jusr as orher animals do, but tht:re's no reason
ro think rhat these particular foatum somehow make rhe human animal more than merely an
animal, they merely makt: tht: human an animal of a panicular sort. The focus upon some
possible flight from or tr.tnscendence of animaliry is p~ec~sely what ~it:r:.sd1·e·aims to overcomt: in his philosophical anrhropology, and it plays a stgmficant role m Ius cnuque of morality (e.g., GM 11:7). Further discussion of this can be found in the num7rous essays. include~
in A Nietzschean Bestiary: Becoming Animal Beyond Docik and Brutal, cdned by Chnsta Dav1s
~pora and Ralph R. Acampora (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
2004).
28. Richard White, Nietzsche and the Problem ofSovereignty, 86.
29. Whire reads Nietzsche as <tffirming the sovereign individual, but his discussion of the
relevant passage is rather limitt:d (see his Niewche and the Problem ofSovereignty, 144ff). Still,
his account of sovereignty and Niensche's concepcion of the individual is richer than those
rhat bt'gin from the sovereign individual as NierL.Sche's paradigm. Sovereignty is a decidedly
problematic issue for Nietzsche, on White's account; it is not a specific ideal rhar we ought
to pursue.

